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LAW'S PARADISE LOST? 
Douglas H. Ginsburg* 
THE LmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT. By Walter K. Olson. New York: Tru-
man Talley Books/Dutton. 1991. Pp. viii, 388. $24.95. 
"This book tells the story of how, in a series of specific changes 
over decades, we changed the rules in our courtrooms to encourage 
citizens to sue each other." Thus does Walter Olson1 begin The Liti-
gation Explosion, in which he describes "a unique experiment in free-
ing the legal profession and the litigious impulse from age-old 
constraints," and pronounces the experiment "a disaster, an unmiti-
gated failure" (pp. 1-2). 
In the author's version of events, there was first an Edenic "classi-
cal" age when rules were rules and not mere standards, and it could be 
"hoped that a lawyer would look at a prospective claim as a judge 
might look, and not just ask if it had raw settlement value" (p. 268). 
But then somehow the legal realists (and other social engineers only 
sometimes identified as economists) came on the scene and began to 
dismantle the set piece by piece. The ethical rules that had governed 
the legal profession in the classical period were discredited as merely a 
means by which the established bar tempered the competition of new-
comers. The rules of civil procedure and the limitations of due process 
were relaxed so that anyone might be sued by some suspicious plaintiff 
whose greatest hope lay in finding, through pretrial discovery, that the 
defendant had injured him. Meanwhile, legislatures were encouraging 
litigation in their own ways, with long-arm statutes, "citizen suit" pro-
visions, and damage multipliers expressly designed to encourage "pri-
vate attorneys general" to vindicate public policies. 
As the cited passages suggest, Olson has written for a popular au-
dience. He treats the subject of litigiousness and its effect upon society 
in a serious but not in a scholarly fashion. For example, the book is 
punctuated with anecdotes, many taken from press accounts of cases 
and the stories behind them, and it contains only a few statistics, 
which makes it impossible to gauge the significance of the phenomena 
it describes. At the same time, Olson provides a useful overview and a 
challenging perspective, from which lawyers and judges too may 
profit. 
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. - Ed. 
1. Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute. 
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The book is divided into five parts. In "The Industry," referring to 
the litigation industry, Olson devotes a chapter each to the judicial 
deregulation of lawyer advertising, the rise of the contingent fee, and 
the resulting "reversal of roles" in which lawyers are the real parties in 
interest in the conduct of some types of litigation, prominently includ-
ing personal injury and shareholder and other class actions. 
As Olson's account reminds us, the norms regarding lawyers' solic-
itation of business changed very quickly. Indeed, less than twenty 
years ago it was still "thought that lawyers should not drum up their 
own business," although the rule was "widely if covertly evaded" (p. 
16). "The ethical lawyer was supposed to sit back passively and wait 
for clients to come;: around" (p. 18). What, then, became of the person 
too timid, ignorant, or lacking in contacts even to seek out a lawyer, 
much less to find a lawyer with the expertise relevant to his or her 
problem? Olson acknowledges that some were "badly wronged for 
want of competent advice. . . . signing the grossly lopsided business 
deal, taking the insurance adjuster's low-ball offer, accepting the dan-
gerous reconciliation with the hot-tempered spouse" (pp. 18-19). 
Nonetheless, by Olson's account, this (to me rather significant) objec-
tion to the norm against lawyer self-promotion did not make much 
headway until it was joined, in the 1970s, by "a different and on the 
whole more sophisticated school of thought . . . especially among 
economists. The new thinking emphasized the benefits rather than the 
dangers of sales promotion" (p. 19). Indeed, so powerful is the obser-
vation that a client is a consumer too that "antitrust enforcers started 
making menacing noises" about the organized bar's longstanding ethi-
cal tenets (p. 21 ). The rest, of course, is history. 
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court grappled with the First 
Amendment objections lawyers raised against state regulation of ad-
vertising, and the result was, as every watcher of late-night television 
knows, very substantial deregulation. 2 "The Court . . . endorsed the 
emergent legal idealogy of the era. That !dealogy encourages each citi-
zen to be fully educated about, the better to seek complete vindication 
of, his set of legally defined interests" (p. 30). Can that be bad? Yes, 
says Olson, because it will stir up litigation, and litigation is injurious! 
Olson stands squarely with Blackstone who, Olson tells us, warned 
about the "pests of civil society, that are perpetually endeavoring to 
2. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (First Amendment precludes 
state from categorically prohibiting lawyers from soliciting business by sending truthful and 
nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (First Amendment commercial speech doc· 
trine precludes reprimand premised on lawyer's advertising for advice on specific legal problems 
and use of illustrations); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (First Amendment protection of 
political expression and association precludes discipline oflawyers for sending letter offering free 
legal assistance to woman sterilized as condition of receiving public medical assistance); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
precludes ban on lawyers' nonmisleading advertising of prices for routine services). 
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disturb the repose of their neighbors, and officiously interfering in 
other men's quarrels."3 
Blackstone's hardly seems like a complete answer. In fact, Olson 
does no more than point out that there will be costs, starting with the 
cost of litigation, if people are fully apprised of their rights. But what 
are rights if they are not known, or once known cannot be vindicated? 
If Americans have too many rights - which is not at all implausible 
in light of the number that courts have discovered only in the last few 
decades - I should think that the solution is not to discourage public-
ity about them, as by lawyer advertising, but to cut them back to an 
appropriate level. Broad constraints upon lawyer advertising inevita-
bly promote public ignorance about individual rights. The conse-
quences of such ignorance are, moreover, at best distributed randomly 
and more often visited disproportionately upon those who can least 
afford to forego their rights. Unfortunately, although Olson empha-
sizes the costs of litigation throughout the book, he does not stop to 
examine separately the contribution that lawyer advertising (or other 
litigation-facilitating devices, such as the contingent fee) has made to 
the overall costs and benefits of litigation. 
In the second part, entitled "The Lawsuit," the author devotes a 
chapter each to jurisdiction (i.e., forum shopping), notice pleading, 
and discovery, in each case providing a broad historical account of the 
journey from the classical period to the present, followed by a spirited 
description of the problems and abuses to which the current rules are 
prone. In Part Three, "The Law," Olson laments the demise of formal 
rules in a variety of areas - for example in custody cases, where the 
efficient presumption in favor of the mother gave way to "the best 
interests of the child" standard, creating much litigation but little 
change - except to give fathers more leverage in bargaining over fi-
nancial terms (p. 137). He also derides the relaxation of the old limits 
on the use of expert testimony (pp. 156-66). There are separate chap-
ters on the evolution of choice of law principles, from classical cer-
tainty to contemporary "interest analysis," and the much exaggerated 
"death of contract." 
In the last-mentioned chapter, Olson gives the lay reader a suc-
cinct account of the legal realists' attack upon formalism in the law of 
contracts4 and a deliciously ironic account of "a second, converging 
line of thinking" (p. 206) coming from the law schools to attack so-
called contracts of adhesion. The concern with such contracts began 
with the faith among "[s]ome influential law professors ... that capi-
talism had an irresistible tendency toward monopoly" (p. 206). In the 
3. P. 27 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135). 
4. Olson explains that "[t]he problem [according to the legal realists] was that the courts 
pretended to object only to the way a deal had been negotiated or worded when they really 
objected to its content." P. 205. 
1612 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1609 
capitalist end-state, the consumer would be confronted only with stan-
dard form contracts, one offered by each "trust." Olson continues: 
What was truly odd about this logic was not so much its fear of impend-
ing universal monopoly, which was typical of its day, as its flying leap to 
the idea that standard off-the-rack contracts are more dangerous to a 
monopoly's customers than contracts dickered one by one. The most 
fearsome monopoly would be precisely the one that dickered with each 
of its customers, because it could then skin each one to the exact limit of 
endurance. Even where monopoly as such is not a problem, markets 
where haggling is the norm . . . are hardly known for consistency of 
customer satisfaction. [p. 207] 
He goes on to note that the rise of the store with the same price for all 
customers was hailed as a great advance in its time and that a seller's 
willingness to treat each customer alike is of special benefit for the 
unsophisticated. Anyone who has traveled outside the most advanced 
market economies knows that Olson is right and that the professors 
were wrong about standard form contracts. 
To return to the structure of the book, however, we next encounter 
"The Consequences." First among them is that "the competitive pres-
sure of the litigation industry tends to weed out softness. Increasingly 
lawyers are found who take the view that they owe opponents no ethi-
cal obligation at all beyond 'strict legal duty' " (p. 233). Second, a 
potential lawsuit now appeals to a lawyer not because of its merits (as 
in the Edenic past, when the lawyer was an agent, not a principal, in 
litigation) but because of its settlement value, which is determined by 
such matters as the adverse media coverage facing the defendant, the 
risk of joint and several liability for the shares of early-settling code-
fendants, and other tactical considerations (pp. 250-58). Finally, indi-
vidual rights are trampled in the course of civil litigation in a way that 
is not tolerated in the criminal law, where accusations are made only 
by a public prosecutor who does not stand personally to benefit by the 
result, and the statutory standards by which the defendant's conduct is 
judged are construed narrowly. The irony, according to Olson, is that 
the institutions of the civil law are now expressly designed to shape 
behavior, often imposing punitive damages in order to deter unwanted 
conduct, while at the same time those accused of engaging in such 
conduct are denied the rights routinely accorded a person accused of 
even a minor crime (pp. 272-93). 
In a final part, .. The Way Out," Olson argues that "America is the 
litigious society it is because American lawyers wield such unparal-
leled powers of imposition" (p. 299), and that "[l]itigation must be 
reformed from within, by rolling back the powers of imposition that 
make it so fearful" (p. 313). Although he is not at all short of sugges-
tions for piecemeal reform - from the curtailment of long arm juris-
diction and punitive damages to the restoration of limits upon the use 
of expert witnesses and discovery - Olson's only systemic solution is 
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"strict liability for litigators themselves" (p. 337). By this he means 
only that the lawyer who brings a losing claim or defends a losing 
position, and thereby imposes anguish and costs upon the other side, 
ought in fairness to pay for the harm he or she has done. According to 
Olson, this is the norm in virtually every other civilized country 
(although it is known here as the English rule) (p. 329). 
The chapter on fee-shifting is the most compelling in the book, in 
no small part because it addresses systematically the problems dis-
cussed for the most part anecdotally over the preceding 300 pages. In 
addition, Olson is careful here to explain how the English approach to 
fee-shifting works; he even stops to examine the questions "If the 
American rule is so patently unjust, why did it ever take hold at all? 
And why has it lasted for more than a century?" (The answer - to 
the first question, anyway - is that "[t]he backers of the original 
American rule were in large measure farmers and frontiersmen who 
wanted to stave off the enforcement against them of debts and mort-
gages about whose face validity there was no real doubt" (pp. 330-
31).) 
In these regards, Olson's consideration of the solution he proposes 
is considerably more analytical than his treatment of the problems it 
addresses. Indeed, the greatest drawback to his book is that it is sim-
ply not very analytical. He "tells the story," as he said he would, "of 
how, in a series of specific changes over decades, we changed the rules 
in our courtrooms to encourage citizens to sue each other" (p. 1 ). But 
he does not really consider why we did these things. By Olson's ac-
count, only the litigators have gained, and only they had any material 
interest in promoting litigation. Why, then, were scholars, legislators, 
and judges so foolish as not just to go along but often even to lead the 
way? To be sure, Olson tells us that litigators have been active in state 
legislatures, both as members and as lobbyists. Is there reason to be-
lieve that they have been more active, however, than corporate general 
counsels, the insurance industry, and the many others whom one 
would expect to oppose them? 
Time and again the reader who wants to know not only what hap-
pened, but why it happened, is left unsatisfied. Having confined him-
self to describing the problem, without much attending to the reasons 
for which presumably practical people created it, he labors under a 
significant limitation: We can agree with everything he says about the 
problems the litigation explosion has created and still not know 
whether it has been, on balance, a good or a bad thing. 
I do not want to criticize Olson unduly, however, for the book that 
he did not write when there is much to praise in the book that he did 
write. He has written a lively and thought-provoking account of his 
subject. He brings home time and again the reminder that 'twas not 
always so, which raises the question whether it need be so now. 
